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There has been an increasing interest in cooperative capital structure and its 
association with the cooperative competitiveness, but the relevant hypothe-
ses have not been tested by using a comprehensive analysis. This paper 
examines the effects of financial ratios on net profit margins using panel 
data for the period 1990-98
1 and explains differences between the coopera-
tive and the investor owned firms (IOFs) operating in the Greek dairy 
industry. The relevant descriptive statistics show that IOFs are more profit-
able, while fixed effect results suggest that profitability differences between 
the two groups can be mainly attributed to the greater effectiveness of IOF 
capital structure determinants. These results provide a clear message to the 
cooperative management that if cooperatives’ aim is to improve their com-
petitiveness against IOFs, then Greek dairy cooperatives should increase 
the contribution of retained profits to capital along with a better exploita-
tion of capital intensity and economies of scale. The paper, however, 
suggests that a study of non-economic aspects is also required for a com-
plete evaluation of the Greek dairy cooperative performance. 
Introduction 
One of the most complicated issues, which concern the financial management of both 
the cooperatives and the IOFs, is the relation between the capital structure of a firm 
 
∗   The first two authors would like to express their deepest sadness for the sudden loss of Prof. Kostas 
Oustapassidis and to stress his major contribution to this paper. Also, they wish to express their special 
thanks to an anonymous referee and to the editor of this journal for suggestions and comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
1  The reason of the absence of more recent data is the change of the country currency from drachmas 
to euro which could probably influence the results and lead to conclusions not representative of the 
structure of the dairy market in the 1990s. 
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and its ability to compete IOFs operated within the same market. What is the opti-
mum value for a number of financial indices to achieve the best possible results in 
terms of competitiveness as it can be measured by profit margin? This problem is of 
particular concern for cooperatives since on the one hand profit maximization is not 
considered to be their primary aim, while on the other they come under enormous 
pressure from competition from the private sector to finance investments and expen-
sive competitive strategies, given that the cooperatives offer the same products and 
they are exposed to the same market conditions with the IOFs (Bateman et al., 1979; 
Oustapassidis, 1998). 
It is well known that the financial structure of the cooperatives is impacted by the 
management system, fundamentally differing from that of IOFs (one man = one vote, 
instead of one share = one vote) with the ensuing consequences as regards the divi-
dends and interest policies. However, it is vital for cooperatives to achieve the 
optimum capital structure in order to be in a position to fund both the necessary in-
vestments and strategies which will render them competitive (Helmberger and Hoos, 
1962; Oustapassidis and Notta, 1997). Otherwise they will not be able to survive in 
the long run within markets where both competitive strategies and investment in new 
technology are intensively applied by the existing firms. Greek dairy manufacturing 
firms are forced to apply such expensive practices to increase their market power 
(Oustapassidis, 1998; Nielsen Hellas, 1990-98). The ability of firms to finance these 
strategies significantly affects the net profit margin and thus their competitiveness.  
While the Industrial Economics literature includes a large number of empirical 
studies referring to the effects of structural (e.g., market share) and organization vari-
ables on firm’s performance (e.g., Scherer and Ross, 1990; Hay and Morris, 1991; 
Martin, 1994; Vlachvei and Oustapassidis, 1998; Oustapassidis and Vlachvei, 1999) 
only few studies (e.g., Martin, 1993) have examined the effects of financial ratios on 
profitability in the manufacturing sector. Further, the relevant cooperative literature 
includes some studies (e.g., Price and Peters, 1983 and 1985; Parliament et al., 1990) 
referring to the financial characteristics of agricultural cooperatives. However, the 
effects of financial variables on both the cooperative and the IOF profitability have 
not been examined by applying a comprehensive analysis. For the purpose of this 
paper panel data are used to estimate linear regression models by employing the 
fixed effects method. Comparison between the two sets of results is made. In addi-
tion, the study of the impact of financial indices on anticipated profits, both of 
cooperative and IOFs, in such a dynamic sector as that of the Greek dairy industry 
(Oustapassidis, 1998) is of particular interest. Subsequently, once we have arrived at 
certain conclusions as to the impact of the above-mentioned indices on net profits, 
we will propose policy measures to improve the economic development of agricul-
tural dairy cooperatives in Greece. 
The analysis will be supported by diagrams while the theoretical model will be 
put forward to test the effects of each of the financial ratios taken separately on prof-
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improvement of financial indices to ensure that their final impact will be effective. 
Following arguments against neoclassical studies examining only financial aspects of 
cooperative performance, we study other non-financial elements of dairy cooperative 
behavior in Greece.  
Cooperative competitiveness and finance 
The structure of capital, and whether it is currently good, excellent or bad, will arise 
from the study and the effectiveness of basic financial indices, such as: the degree of 
coverage of fixed assets by equity capital, the capital intensity, the ratio of fixed to 
total assets and the degree of internal finance which all affect the cost of capital 
(Brigham and Gapenski, 1991; Fama, 1991; Martin, 1993 and 1994). Moreover, it is 
reasonable for someone to believe that only by creating undistributed profits, on the 
one hand, and exploiting certain privileges and advantages at their disposal on the 
other, cooperatives can fulfill the role they have taken, which depends on their ability 
to compete IOFs on the market. Cooperatives that successfully compete IOFs can 
increase their price cost margin and thus their profitability and their ability to invest 
in both sales promotion strategies and modern technology. The higher the proportion 
of undistributed profits to total cooperative profits, the cheaper the cost of capital 
used to finance investment required for development and cooperative competitive-
ness. This, of course, may not satisfy short run interests of the cooperative members 
who may prefer the distribution of all, or a great proportion, of cooperative surplus as 
dividends among them. If cooperative management applies a policy satisfying short 
term interests of the membership, then it will find it difficult to finance development 
programs by borrowing capital from the banks, which requires the payment of an 
extra cost for the interest. 
Cooperatives were formed (Porter and Scully, 1987; Oustapassidis, 1988 and 
1992) in response to problems in the market system for agricultural products. In or-
der to combat the disadvantage at which they stood compared to the organized large 
businesses in the sector, the producers and various small enterprises formed these 
organizations. There are of course differences with respect to the aims of IOFs and 
cooperatives, a consequence of which are the different strategies used by each. 
Strong competition forces de facto the management of cooperatives to adopt the 
same strategies as the private sector. Whether or not profits are expected to be made 
from an economic activity, the need for constant modernization and investment in 
new technology, as well as the finance of expensive competitive strategies such as 
product differentiation, is imperative. The dairies of the sample do not differ in their 
technology since both cooperatives and IOFs have access to the same technology. 
Thus, they do not differ in their technology and production methods. The ability to 
finance investments is associated with the existence of retained profits and the level 
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of interest for the share capital, cooperatives suffer from a competitive disadvantage 
against IOFs, since these principles will cause difficulties in raising capital required 
to finance investments.  
According to the cooperative literature (e.g., van Bekkum and van Dijk, 1997) 
there seems to be a growing interest in creating new financial solutions challenging 
the traditional way of organizing a cooperative that has not succeeded in becoming 
sufficiently viable in competitive food industries. Such reorganizations that have 
taken place improve capital structure and enable cooperatives to finance huge in-
vestments also in intangible assets. In some countries (e.g., Ireland, The Netherlands, 
Austria) some cooperatives were transformed into joint stock companies with both 
farmer-members and private investors constituting their shareholders. Other innova-
tions in Europe and North America include the introduction of tradable shares. 
Specification of the profit model 
Following the relevant Industrial Economics literature (Martin, 1993) the Lerner 










where p is the market price, si the firm’s market share, eQP the price elasticity of 
demand and c is the total cost. Total cost is the cost of variable factors plus the nor-
mal rate of return on capital: 
ci(qi) = wLi + nKi  (2) 
where qi is firm i’s output, w can be thought as a vector of input prices, Li as a 
vector of input levels, ρ is the rate of return on capital unit and Ki is the value of firm 
i’s assets. Then with little manipulation equation (1) yields an expression for firm 
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The left hand term is equal to the net profits to total assets ratio. The term on the 
right hand is equal to the market share si (the proportion of firm’s sales to the total 
industry sales), the ratio of the firm’s sales (pqi) over its total assets (Ki) and the price 
elasticity of demand (eQP). Data for price elasticity of demand are not easily available 
but the empirical studies (Martin, 1993) usually use other variables to express the 
elasticity of demand. The elasticity of demand in a competitive market is mainly 
determined by competitive strategies such as advertising intensity, R&D, market 
channels and other strategies. Given that the above are expensive strategies depend-
ing on the availability of capital, it is reasonable to express the elasticity of demand 
as a function of the capital structure determinants.  
 
So, we include in the model a number of financial indices describing the capital 
structure along with the two variables appeared in (3) (e.g., Scherer and Ross, 1990; 
Martin, 1993 and 1994). Thus the specified empirical model is: 
NRT = a0 + a1MS + a2KS + a3NWFA + a4FATA + a5NPCP (4) 
where: 
NRT  is the annual profitability expressed as the ratio of net returns to assets; 
MS  is the market share as the proportion of firm’s sales to the total industry 
sales; 
KS   is the ratio of total assets over sales; 
NWFA is the equity coverage of fixed assets index given by the ratio of net worth 
to fixed assets showing the ability of a firm to cover long run investment 
by its own capital; 
FATA  is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; 
NPCP  is the internal finance index, that is the ratio of reserve capital (retained or 
undistributed profits) to the share capital showing the annual contribution 
of the retained profits to the capital formation. 
 
Following the relevant literature (Martin, 1993; Shepherd, 1994; Lev, 1974; Chen et 
al., 1985; Copeland, 1983; Parliament et al., 1990) the following have to be noted 
with regard to the empirical model. 
a)  It is expected that market share is a main determinant of firm market power 
and that higher market share will cause higher concentration, lower competi-
tion, lower cost due to economies of scale and higher profit margin (a1>0); 
b)  It is expected that the higher the ratio of total assets over sales, the higher the 
profitability, as the higher the capital intensity, the higher the ability of a 
firm to differentiate its product (a2>0);  
c)  If the ratio of equity capital to fixed assets is high, the firm can cover its 
long-term investment requirements from its own capital. Since this capability 
minimizes the risk of losing capital assets, its consequence is easier funding 100  Y. Ananiadis, O. Notta and K. Oustapassidis 
 
to achieve a further increase in sales. Thus we expect the impact of this in-
dex on profitability to be positive (a3>0); 
d)  We would note that the higher the proportion of fixed assets to total assets, 
the greater will its negative impact be on the net profit of the enterprise, 
given that sales are likely to be low since the firm will be short of the neces-
sary materials, stocks, etc., with an overall reduced level of activity due to 
the reduced level of current assets (a4<0); 
e)  Finally, the extent of internal finance is expected to have a positive impact 
especially if interest rates are high, as they have been in Greece, over the 
study period (Agricultural Bank of Greece, 1992-98) and thus the high cost 
of capital (a5>0). This can be explained by the fact that if the company has 
financial independence, the cost of the required capital will be less than in 
the case of firms depending on external finance. Firms using internal finance 
pay a low cost for the borrowed capital to boost their activities either through 
the purchase of materials and stocks or through increasing sales. 
Data and variables 
Table 1 shows that the contribution of the agricultural sector to both GDP (7.5%) and 
total employment (20.8%) in Greece is greater than in the other European Union 
countries where the respective mean figures are 2.47 percent and 7.47 percent. These 
figures show that agriculture plays an important role in the Greek economy. The 
study of cooperative figures (total number, membership and turnover) clearly shows 
that although Greek agricultural cooperatives include a larger number of organiza-
tions than most other EU members, their turnover is smaller than the respective 
figures in these countries indicating that the role of cooperatives in agricultural mar-
keting is rather limited. The last column of Table 1 shows that EU dairy sector is 
dominated by cooperatives. The relevant figures for cooperative market share, espe-
cially in the north EU countries, are very high (e.g., 100 percent in Ireland, 99 
percent in Finland, 98 percent in the UK). The respective figures for Italy (38%) and 
Spain (35%) are substantially lower than the above ones. Finally, Greek dairy coop-
eratives follow by having the lowest market share among the EU dairy co-ops. This 
indicates that these organizations face serious problems in terms of competition 
against IOFs within the Greek dairy market.  
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Belgium  1.6  2.5  not avail.  not avail.  not avail.  50 
Denmark (‘91)  2.5  5.7  214  113,000  12.1  93 
Germany (‘96)  0.8  3.0  3,950  3,280,000  39.3  58 
Greece (‘96)  7.5  20.8  6,919  782,000  0.85  20 
Spain (‘96)  2.7  9.8  4,350  950,000  6.3  35 
France (‘93)  2.0  4.8  3,618  720,000  52.6  49 
Ireland (‘95)  5.4  12.0  128  186,000  9.59  100 
Italy (‘95)  2.6  7.9  8,850  1,124,900  16.45  38 
Luxembourg (‘95)  0.9  2.8  25  (100%)  0.12  80 
Netherlands (‘96)  3.2  4.0  251  273,000  22.4  82 
Austria (‘96)  2.2  13.3  1,757  2,182,000  not avail.  90 
Portugal (‘96)  2.0  11.6  909  800,000  1.27  87 
Finland (‘95)  1.8**  8.3**  403  1,228,500  7.59  94 
Sweden (‘95)  1.0  3.4  50  300,000  8.24  99 
UK (‘95)  0.9  2.2  506  271,000  7.66  98 
Average 2.47  7.47  167.69  872,172  13.17  71.46 
* include  double  countings 
** excl.  forestry 
Source:  van Bekkum & van Dijk, 1997, a study carried out by the Netherlands Institute for 
Cooperative Entrepreneurship (NICE) at the request of COGECA and co-sponsored 
by the European Commission, DG XXIII.  
  (Calculations have been made by the authors). 
 
It is important to note that the dairy cooperatives of the sample, including all large 
dairy manufacturing co-ops in Greece, not only had a rather small market share at the 
beginning of the period but also their aggregate share declined from 20.50 percent to 
18.00 percent between 1990 and 1998 (ICAP Hellas, 1990-98). These figures indi-
cate a loss of cooperative competitiveness against their IOFs competitors. 
The study uses panel data for the 31 largest firms covering a period of nine years 
(1990-98). This period is sufficient to give a reliable evaluation of the factors influ-
encing profit. The data also allow us to study the differences between IOFs and 
cooperatives and the impact of the same variables on net profit. To study this effect 
on the profit ratio, we collected data from both the balance sheets and the income 
statements of the large dairy companies in Greece for the study period. It is important 
to note that all Greek firms are obliged to publish their annual balance sheets and 
income statements which are available on an annual basis by a proprietary service 
company called ICAP. So, the data were taken from the ICAP database (ICAP, 1990-102  Y. Ananiadis, O. Notta and K. Oustapassidis 
 
98). The sample includes cooperative and IOFs comprising 90 percent of total turn-
over in the sector (the rest is covered by a large number of small local firms). 
Twenty-six of the companies are IOFs and the rest cooperatives. The authors calcu-
lated the profit ratios, structural variables and financial indices used. 
Following the relevant financial economics and accounting literature (e.g., Kim, 
1978; Haugen and Senbet, 1978; Parliament et al., 1990) we calculate and study the 
mean values of the annual financial indices, which are expected to affect profitabil-
ity, for the full sample and the two groups (cooperatives and IOFs). The ratio of net 
worth to fixed assets gives the index of coverage of fixed assets by equity capital. 
When that index is greater than one, the firm funds long-term investments through 
equity capital, minimizing the risk of losing its property assets (through bankruptcy). 
The ratio of fixed to total assets shows the proportion of available assets in fixed and 
in current assets. This index has to be below 1 since it would not be reasonable for a 
firm to invest its capital only in fixed assets nor in fixed assets in greater proportion 
than its current assets for, as it is known, income is generated by current elements 
only. Finally the ratio of reserve capital formed by the retained profits to share capi-
tal shows the extent of autonomous internal finance. The higher this figure, the 
greater the extent to which undistributed profits is made available to finance the 
firm’s activity. 
Table 2 shows the mean values of all variables included in the models for each of 
the categories of firms and overall for the sample used. The indices for profitability 
show that IOFs are more profitable than cooperatives. The sign for the co-ops is 
negative indicating that some of them are unprofitable. The value for the total assets 
to sales ratio (0.83) for cooperatives show a lower capital intensity for leaving room 
for a further increase of this ratio to approach the value (0.87) that corresponds to 
IOFs. The index of coverage of fixed assets by equity capital in the private sector 
indicates that these companies have a greater capability to finance long-term invest-
ments compared to the cooperatives, which on average give negative values for this 
index (-0.35). The fixed to total assets ratio for both IOFs and cooperative dairies can 
be seen to be favorable since it is less than 1 (0.46 and 0.35, respectively). The value 
of the internal finance index (1.03) for this period for the investor owned dairies is 
much more favorable due to the reasons outlined above, while in contrast, for the 
cooperatives it is negative (-3.82). 
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Table* 2: Mean values of variables by group, 1990-98 
 




















0.45 0.46 0.35 
NPCP 
Reserve capital 
Capital  0.21 1.03 -3.82 
Source:  ICAP HELLAS, 1990-98. 
  (Annual Balance Sheet Data of the Greek Manufacturing Companies). 
Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the Fixed Effect (FE) method
2. The method provides a 
dynamic evaluation of the effects of the financial variables included in the model of 
the profitability changes and it is able to isolate the particularities of certain compa-
nies (Judge et al., 1988). The value of R
2 for the full model shows that a great 
proportion (59%) of the profitability changes of both IOFs and cooperatives in the 
dairy sector can be mainly explained by the three (KS, NWFA and NPCP) financial 
indices and the structural (MS) variable included in the model. Further, the results 
show that the three variables (the capital intensity, the equity coverage to fixed assets 
and the internal finance index) have all the expected positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect on profitability. As we expected the effect of market share is positive and 
significant while the coefficient of the ratio of the fixed to total assets is insignifi-
cant. 
 
                                                        
2   The estimation of the Fixed Effect method was made by the use of the programme “LIMDEP, 1996”. 104  Y. Ananiadis, O. Notta and K. Oustapassidis 
 
Table 3: Fixed effects estimates of profitability by sample, 1990-98 
(t-values in parentheses) 
 
Variables \ Sample  All  IOFs  Co-ops 
 FE  FE  FE 


















































      
R
2 0.58  0.67  0.45 





*  Denotes statistical significant results at 5% (or less) level of significance. 
a:   There are 31 annual observations with no complete data for all variables. 
b:  The size of this sample is rather small but the model for cooperatives is estimated just for 
comparison with the IOFs. 
 
The second model simply explains profitability differences among the IOFs. One can 
see that the market share, capital intensity, net worth to fixed assets and reserves to 
capital ratios are statistically significant with a positive impact, showing that the lar-
ger these indices are, the greater the level of profitability is among the IOFs.  
The third model gives the estimates for the cooperative dairy companies in the 
sample. The results for the cooperatives show that only one variable (net worth to 
fixed assets) has the expected positive and significant effect on net profits and ex-
plains profitability differences among the co-ops. The coefficient of the net worth 
over fixed assets index is positive and significant. This result shows that cooperatives 
financing their fixed assets formation by their own funds (capital and reserves) are 
more profitable than other cooperatives depending more on borrowed capital.     Cooperative Competitiveness and Capital Structure  105 
 
                                                       
These results are consistent with the results of a previous article published on this 
journal and referred to Greek dairy industry for the period 1990-94 (Oustapassidis 
and Notta, 1997). According to the results of that paper, the survival of cooperatives, 
especially in differentiated food manufacturing industries, heavily depends on their 
ability to finance expensive competitive strategies such as advertising and diversifi-
cation, from their retained profits. If cooperatives’ objective is to improve their 
performance in the dairy market, they must finance expensive competitive strategies 
mainly by internal sources of capital.  
Non financial aspects of cooperative performance 
It is known that cooperatives and IOFs are generally viewed as different types (e.g., 
Helmberger and Hoos, 1962; Parliament et al., 1990) of firms since cooperatives 
cannot be characterized as profit maximizing organizations. This has a number of 
implications in terms of the management and performance of cooperatives and their 
ability to provide public goods and services to both their members and the society, 
which cannot be captured by a financial analysis. It is, therefore, worth noting that a 
complete evaluation of the cooperative performance requires a more general analysis 
that should also include non-financial aspects of cooperative behavior. 
The non-profit cooperatives – especially the competitive ones – promote competi-
tion and bring efficiency in the markets where they operate. Nourse (1922) suggested 
that one of the roles cooperatives play is that of competitive yardstick. Similarly, 
Staatz (1987) notes that farmers may form a cooperative to force the IOFs, through 
competition, to improve their services to farmers and to generate benefits to all farm-
ers in the area of the cooperative. Cooperatives also provide services like educational 
programs, insurance for farm products, generic advertising aiming to promote de-
mand in agricultural products and representing farmer interests in state and EU 
organizations. The non-profit maximizing operation of cooperatives increases pro-
duction of both agricultural inputs and food products which, in turn, may result in 
solving employment problems in rural areas. 
Studies based only on an economic approach often argued against government 
policy promoting the emergence of inefficient cooperatives through subsidization 
programs given that such a policy may prevent the development of more efficient 
IOF’s in the market (Porter and Scully, 1987). However, these conclusions have to be 
modified if there is evidence of monopsony power in the industry. Data for the mar-
ket share of the leading Greek dairy companies
3 provide evidence of the presence of 
economies of scale, which suggests the potential for monopsony power. To the extent 
that the Greek dairy milk-processing industry lends itself to monopsony, the presence 
of cooperatives might be viewed as limiting the monopsonistic exploitation by IOF’s. 
 
3  The market shares of the largest dairy firms in 1998 are as follows: Fage (IOF) 22%, Delta (IOF) 
22%, Mevgal (IOF) 9%, Agno (Co-op) 7%, Dodoni (Co-op) 7% and Nestle (IOF) 6%. 106  Y. Ananiadis, O. Notta and K. Oustapassidis 
 
In this sense the existence of efficient or even of a few inefficient cooperatives pro-
motes the efficient behavior of proprietary firms. Also, the existence of monopsonistic 
milk processors might raise the transaction cost of milk processing. To the extent that 
vertical integration through cooperatives lowers this cost, cooperatives enjoy an ad-
vantage that offsets some of the disadvantages suggested by the above financial and 
econometric analysis. The benefits, however, that are associated with the presence of 
dairy cooperatives and increase general market efficiency and social welfare, cannot 
be captured only by the financial analysis. The latter refers to the producer (firm) 
surplus and ignores elements of farmer and consumer surplus. For example if the 
presence of a dairy cooperative that is less profitable than an IOF, through the pro-
motion of competition, increases farmer income more than the respective decrease in 
its profitability, then its presence in the market will be beneficial, given that its net 
effect on the social (e.g., farmers, consumers) welfare is positive.  
The debate over cooperative facing competitiveness includes increasingly meta-
economic considerations and arguments against conversions of agricultural coopera-
tive organizations to investment oriented forms. Gray and Mooney (1988) criticized 
neo-classical economic studies suggesting the transformation of cooperatives to more 
efficient type of firms by applying strategies such as internal re-structuring, sell-outs 
and hybridization of cooperatives. The main interest of these organizations would no 
longer be based on member-use but on much narrower financial issues. According to 
the authors, neo-classical economics analyses do not allow the scientist to see his-
torical and sociological aspects of cooperatives and broader implications of 
conversions. Although the authors recognize the importance of the financial studies, 
they argue for broadening the scope of the relevant analysis by including non eco-
nomic aspects, mainly social and community, and for a more complete expression of 
the practical implications of the conversion of agricultural cooperatives. 
Given the difficulties associated with the evaluation of performance on coopera-
tive specific objectives non captured by financial analysis, this work follows other 
similar studies (e.g., Boynton and Babb, 1982) and reports rather qualitative informa-
tion from a survey conducted in 1999 among managers of the two (DODONI and 
AGNO) largest cooperatives of the sample. The managers reported the following 
advantages as perceived by cooperative members: 
1.  Members receive dividends that especially in periods of profitable activities 
increase substantially the final farmer price; 
2.  Cooperatives supply their members with animal foodstuffs characterized by 
high quality standards at low price; 
3.  Cooperatives provide technical services in areas of production and manage-
ment aiming to improve quality and quantity of milk production; 
4.  Small and isolated producers are served by their organizations while IOFs 
avoid serving small farmers even if their production meets high quality stan-
dards; 
5.  Cooperative members enjoy better terms of payment (e.g., no delay).    Cooperative Competitiveness and Capital Structure  107 
 
Conclusions and proposals 
The study uses panel data for the 31 largest dairy manufacturing firms in Greece for 
the period 1990-1998 to examine the effects of financial factors on annual profit 
margins of all the firms in the industry and separately for the IOFs and the coopera-
tives. A comprehensive panel data analysis (fixed effects) was applied to examine the 
relationships between net profitability and financial ratios. 
It was found that the degree to which equity capital covers fixed assets, the de-
gree of self-finance, the capital to sales ratio along with the market share, are 
positively associated with profitability of all the dairy firms irrespective of their form 
of ownership. The study showed that cooperatives are less profitable than IOFs and 
that the effects of financial variables on profitability significantly differ between the 
two groups of firms. These results along the mean values of the relevant variables 
suggest that cooperatives must alter their capital structure to have financial indices 
similar to those of the IOFs. According to the obtained results the improvement of 
the cooperative financial variables is expected to improve cooperative performance. 
Based on the results we propose that the cooperatives take a number of measures 
such as: 
•  increase their share capital which should derive in part from a partial reten-
tion of the distributable annual profit; 
•  increase the reserve fund beyond that set by the articles of association in or-
der to improve the extent of self-finance; 
•  new and state-of-the-art investments in production should be planned. Such 
investment will reduce production cost due to the introduction of new technology;  
•  although there are important differences between cooperative and IOF manage-
ment, cooperative dairies should improve their financial management in order to 
increase their sales and thus the income of their members. 
This article does not suggest that the evaluation of Greek dairy cooperative per-
formance should consider only financial determinants; it recommends that other 
broader aspects referring to both society and community values should be also exam-
ined along with the financial analysis for a complete assessment of the cooperative 
competitiveness.  
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